We propose an image encryption scheme based on quasi-resonant Rossby/drift wave triads (related to elliptic surfaces) and Mordell elliptic curves (MECs). By defining a total order on quasi-resonant triads, at a first stage we construct quasi-resonant triads using auxiliary parameters of elliptic surfaces in order to generate pseudo-random numbers. At a second stage, we employ a MEC to construct a dynamic substitution box (S-box) for the plain-image. The generated pseudo-random numbers and S-box are used respectively to provide diffusion and confusion in the tested image. We test the proposed scheme against well-known attacks by encrypting all gray images taken from the USC-SIPI image database. Our experimental results indicate the high security of the newly developed scheme. Finally, via extensive comparisons we show that the new scheme outperforms other popular schemes.
Introduction
The exchange of confidential images via internet is usual in today's life, even though the internet is an open source that is unsafe and unauthorised persons can steal useful or sensitive information. Therefore it is essential to be able to share images in a secure way. This goal is achieved by cryptography. Traditional cryptographic techniques such as data encryption standard (DES) and advanced encryption standard (AES) are not suitable for image transmission because image pixels are usually highly correlated [1, 2] . In contrast, DES and AES are ideal techniques for text encryption [3] , so researchers are trying to develop such techniques to meet the demand for reliable image delivery.
A number of image encryption schemes have been developed using different approaches [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . One of the dominant trends in encryption techniques is the chaos based encryption [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . The reason is that the chaos based encryption schemes are highly sensitive to the initial parameters. The chaos based algorithms normally use pseudo-random numbers and substitution boxes (S-boxes) to create confusion and diffusion [19, 20] . "Confusion" means to hide the relation between input image, secret keys and the corresponding cipher-image, and "diffusion" means to alter the value of each pixel in an input image [1] . Cheng et al. [19] proposed an image encryption algorithm based on pseudo-random numbers and AES S-box. The pseudo-random numbers are generated using AES S-box and chaotic tent maps. The scheme is optimised by combining the permutation and diffusion phases, but the image is encrypted in rounds which is time consuming. Belazi et al. [20] suggested an image encryption algorithm using a new chaotic map and logistic map. The new chaotic map is used to generate a sequence of pseudo-random numbers for a masking phase. Then eight dynamic S-boxes are generated. The masked image is substituted in blocks via aforementioned S-boxes. The substituted image is again masked by another pseudo-random sequence arXiv:2003.03394v1 [cs.CR] 6 Mar 2020 generated by the logistic map. Finally the encrypted image is obtained by permuting the masked image. The permutation is done by a sequence generated by the map function. This algorithm fulfils the security analysis but performs slowly due to the four cryptographic phases. In [21] an image encryption method based on chaotic maps and dynamic S-boxes is proposed. The chaotic maps are used to generate the pseudo-random sequences and S-boxes. To break the correlation, pixels of an input image are permuted by the pseudo-random sequences. In a second phase the permuted image is decomposed into blocks. Then blocks are encrypted by the generated S-boxes to get the cipher-image. From histogram analysis it follows that the suggested technique generates cipher-images with a nonuniform distribution.
Similar to the chaotic maps, Elliptic Curves (ECs) are sensitive to input parameters, but EC based cryptosystems are more secure than those of chaos [22] . Toughi et al. [23] developed a hybrid encryption algorithm using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and AES. The points of an EC are used to generate pseudo-random numbers and keys for encryption are acquired by applying AES to the pseudo-random numbers. The proposed algorithm gets the promising security but pseudo-random numbers are generated via the group law, which is time consuming. In [3] a cyclic EC and a chaotic map are combined to design an encryption algorithm. The developed scheme overcomes the drawbacks of small key space but is unsafe to the known-plaintext/chosen-plaintext attack [24] . Similarly Hayat et al. [25] proposed an EC based encryption technique. The stated scheme generates pseudo-random numbers and dynamic S-boxes in two phases, where the construction of S-box is not guaranteed for each input EC. Therefore, changing of ECs to generate an S-box is a time-consuming work. Furthermore, the generation of ECs for each input image makes it insufficient.
Based on the above discussion, we propose an improved image encryption algorithm, based on quasi-resonant Rossby/drift wave triads [26, 27] (triads, for short) and Mordell Elliptic Curves (MECs). The triads are utilised in the generation of pseudo-random numbers and MECs are employed to create dynamic S-boxes using the technique introduced in [28] . The proposed scheme is novel in that it introduces the technique of pseudo-random numbers generation using triads, which is faster than generating pseudo-random numbers by ECs. Moreover, the scheme does not require to separately generate triads for each input image of the same size. In the present scheme MECs are used opposite to [25] in the sense that now, for each input image, the generation of a dynamic S-box is guaranteed [29] . Finally, extensive performance analyses and comparisons reveal the efficiency of the proposed scheme. This paper is organised as follows. Preliminaries are described in Section 2. In Section 3, the proposed encryption algorithm is explained in detail. Section 4 provides the experimental results of the newly developed scheme. A comparison is drawn in Section 5 between the proposed method and existing popular schemes. Lastly, conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Barotropic vorticity equation:
The barotropic vorticity equation (in the so-called β-plane approximation) is a partial differential equation of the form
where ψ(x, y, t) ∈ R represents the stream function, γ is a real constant and F is a non-negative real constant. We assume periodic boundary conditions: ψ(x + 2π, y, t) = ψ(x, y + 2π, t) = ψ(x, y, t) for all x, y, t ∈ R. In literature Eq. (1) is also known as the Charney-Hasegawa-Mima equation (CHM) [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . This equation accepts many special solutions, including travelling wave solutions. Of central importance is the so-called Rossby wave, which is a solution of both the linearised form and the whole (nonlinear) form of Eq. (1). This solution is given explicitly by the parameterised function ψ (k,l) (x, y, t) = e i(kx+ly−ω(k,l)t) ,
where ω(k, l) = − γ k k 2 +l 2 +F is called the angular frequency and (k, l) ∈ Z 2 is called the wave vector. For simplicity we take γ = −1 and F = 0 in what follows [26, 27] . Resonant triad, quasi-resonant triad and detuning level: A linear combination of Rossby waves parameterised by wave vectors that are not collinear, is again a solution of the linearised form of Eq. (1), but not a solution of the whole equation. However, to the lowest order of nonlinearity in Eq. (1), approximate solutions known as resonant triad solutions can be constructed via linear combinations. Any set of three wave vectors (k 1 , l 1 ), (k 2 , l 2 ) and (k 3 , l 3 ) satisfying the equations:
for
for a large positive number δ, then the triad becomes a quasi-resonant triad and δ −1 is known as the detuning level of the quasi-resonant triad. For simplicity, in what follows we call a quasi-resonant triad simply a triad and denote it by ∆. Finally, to avoid over-counting of triads we will impose the condition k 3 > 0.
Rational transformation:
In [26] wave vectors are explicitly expressed in terms of rational variables X, Y and D as follows:
In the case F = 0 the rational variables X, Y, D lie on an elliptic surface. The transformation is bijective and its inverse mapping is given by:
New parameterisation: In [35] , Kopp parameterised the resonant triads and in terms of parameters u and t it follows by [35, Eq. (1.22) ] that:
In 2019, Hayat et al. [27] found a new parameterisation of X, Y and D in terms of auxiliary parameters a, b and hence k 1
and l 1 k 3 are given by:
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Elliptic curve: Let F p be a finite field for any prime p, then an EC E p over F p is defined by
where b, c ∈ F p . The integers b, c and p are called parameters of an EC. The number of all (x, y) ∈ F 2 p satisfying the congruence (11) is denoted by #E p . For b = 0, the type of ECs is known as Mordell elliptic curve (MEC). If points on E p are ordered according to some total order ≺ then E p is said to be an ordered EC. Recall that total order is a binary relation which possesses the reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive properties. Azam et al. [28] introduced a total order known as a natural ordering on MECs given by
and generated efficient S-boxes using the aforesaid ordering. We will use natural ordering to generate S-boxes. Thus from here on E p stands for a naturally ordered MEC unless it is specified otherwise.
The Proposed encryption scheme
The proposed encryption scheme is based on pseudo-random numbers and S-boxes. The pseudo-random numbers are generated using quasi-resonant triads. To get an appropriate level of diffusion we need to properly order the ∆s. For this purpose we define a binary relation as follows.
Ordering on quasi-resonant triads
Let ∆, ∆ represent the triads (k i , l i ), (k i , l i ), i = 1, 2, 3 respectively, then
where a, b and a , b are the corresponding auxilary parameters of ∆ and ∆ respectively. Lemma 1. If T denotes the set of ∆s in a box of size L, then is a total order on T.
Proof. The reflexivity of follows from a = a, b = b and k 3 = k 3 and hence ∆ ∆. As for antisymmetry we suppose ∆ ∆ and ∆ ∆. Then, by definition a ≤ a and a ≤ a, which imply a = a . So we are left with two results: b ≤ b and b ≤ b, which imply b = b . Thus, we obtain the results k 3 ≤ k 3 and k 3 ≤ k 3 , which ultimately give k 3 = k 3 . Solving Eqs. (8)-(10) for the obtained values we get k 1 = k 1 , l 3 = l 3 and from Eq. (2) it follows that l 2 = l 2 . Consequently ∆ = ∆ and is antisymmetric. As for transitivity, let us assume ∆ ∆ and ∆ ∆ . Then a ≤ a and a ≤ a , implying a ≤ a . If a < a then transitivity follows. If a = a , then a = a too.
Let * T stand for the set of ∆s ordered with respect to the order . The main steps of the proposed scheme are explained as follows.
Encryption
A. Public parameters:
In order to exchange the useful information the sender and receiver should agree on the public parameters described as below:
(1) Three sets: Choose three sets A i = [A i , B i ], i = 1, 2, 3 of consecutive numbers with unknown step sizes, where the end points A i , B i , i = 1, 2, 3 are rational numbers. (2) A total order: Select a total order ≺ so that the triads generated by the above mentioned sets may be arranged with respect to that order.
Suppose that P represents an image of size m × n to be encrypted, and the pixels of P are arranged in column wise linear ordering. Thus, for positive integer i ≤ mn, P(i) represents the i-th pixel value in linear ordering. Assume that S P is the sum of all pixel values of image P. Then the proposed scheme chooses the secret keys in the following ways.
B. Secret keys:
To generate confusion and diffusion in an image, the sender chooses the secret keys as follows.
(1)
Step size: Select positive integers a i , b i to construct the step sizes
Also choose a non-negative integer a 3 as a step size of A 3 in such a way that ∏ 3 i=1 n i ≥ mn, where #A i = n i represents the number of elements in A i .
(2) Detuning level: Fix some posive integer δ to find the detuning level δ −1 allowed for the triads.
(3) Bound: Select a positive integer L such that |k i |, |l i | ≤ L for i = 1, 2, 3. This condition is imposed in order to bound the components of the triad wave vectors. Furthermore, choose an integer t to find r = S P /t , where · gives the nearest integer when S P is divided by t. The reason for choosing such a t is to generate key dependent S-boxes and the integer r is used to diffuse the components of triads. (4) A prime: Select a prime p ≥ 257 such that p ≡ 2 (mod 3) as a secret key for computing c ≡ S P + t (mod p) to generate an S-box ζ E p (p, t, S P ) on the E p .
The positive integers a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , a 3 , δ, L, S P , t and p are secret keys. Here it is mentioned that the parameters a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , a 3 , δ and L are used to generate mn triads in a box of size L. The generation of triads is explained step by step in Algorithm 1. These triads along with keys S P and t are used to generate the sequence β * T (t, S P ) of pseudo-random numbers.
Thus ∆ j represents the j-th triad in ordered set * T. Moreover, (k ji , l ji ), i = 1, 2, 3 are the components of ∆ j . In Algorithm 2, the generation of β * T (t, S P ) is explained.
The proposed sequence β * T (t, S P ) is cryptographically a good source of pseudo-randomness because triads are highly sensitive to the auxiliary parameters (a, b) [27] and inverse detuning level δ. It is shown in [26] that the intricate structure of clusters formed by triads depends on the chosen δ, and the size of the clusters increases as the inverse detuning level increases. Moreover, the generation of triads is rapid due to the absence of modular operation. 
D. Performing confusion. Nonlinear function causes confusion in a cryptosystem, and nonlinear components are necessary for a secure data encryption scheme. The current scheme uses the dynamic S-boxes to produce the confusion in an encrypted image. If C P stands for the encrypted image of P, then confusion is performed by the Eq. (13) as follows:
Lemma 2. If #A i = n i , i = 1, 2, 3 and p is a prime chosen for the generation of an S-box, then the time complexity of the proposed encryption scheme is max{O(n 1 n 2 n 3 ), 256p}.
Proof. The computation of all possible values of k 1 , l 3 and l 1 in Algorithm (1) takes O(n 1 n 2 ) time. Similarly the time complexity for generating * T is O(c 1 n 3 ) but c 1 executes n 1 n 2 times. Thus the time required by * T and hence by β * T (t, S P ) is O(n 1 n 2 n 3 ). Also Algorithm 1 in [28] shows that the proposed S-box can be constructed in O(256p) time. Thus the time complexity of the proposed scheme is max{O(n 1 n 2 n 3 ), 256p}.
Decryption
In our scheme the decryption process can take place by reversing the operations of the encryption process. One should know the inverse S-box ζ −1 E p (n, t, S P ) and the pseudo-random numbers β * T (t, S P ). Assume the situation when the secret keys a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , a 3 , δ, L, S P , t and p are transmitted by a secure channel, so that the set * T is obtained using keys a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , a 3 , δ and L, and hence the S-box ζ −1 E p (p, t, S P ) and the pseudo-random numbers β * T (t, S P ) can be computed by S P , t and p. Finally, the receiver gets the original image P by applying the following equations:
Security analysis
In this section the security of the proposed scheme is analysed. For this purpose the current scheme is implemented on all gray images of USC-SIPI Image Database [36] . The USC-SIPI database contains images of size m × m, m = 256, 512, 1024. Furthermore, some security analyses which are explained one by one in the associated subsections are presented. To validate the quality of the proposed scheme, the experimental results are compared with some other encryption schemes. The parameters used for the experiments are A 1 = A 2 = −1.0541, A 3 = 401, B 1 = B 2 = −0.8514, B 3 = 691, 3036, 5071 for m = 256, 512, 1024 resp., a 1 = 2, b 1 = 1000, a 2 = 19, b 2 = 1000, a 3 = 5, δ = 1000, t = 2, L = 90000 and S P varies for each P. The experiments are performed using Matlab R2016a on a personal computer with 1.8 GHz Processor and 6 GB RAM. All encrypted images of the database along with histograms are available at https://github.com/ikram702314/Results. Some plain-images House 256×256 , Stream 512×512 , Boat 512×512 and Male 1024×1024 and their cipher-images are displayed in Fig. 1 .
Statistical attack
A cryptosystem is said to be secure if it has high resistance against statistical attacks. The strength of resistance against statistical attacks is measured by entropy, correlation and histogram tests. All these tests are applied to evaluate the performance of the discussed scheme.
(1) Histogram.
Histogram is a graphical way to display the frequency distribution of pixel values of an image. A secure cryptosystem generates cipher-images with uniform histograms. The histograms of the encrypted images using the proposed method are available at https://github.com/ikram702314/Results. However, the respective histograms for images in Fig. 1 are shown in Fig. 2 . The histograms of the encrypted images are almost uniform. Moreover, the histogram of an encrypted image is totally different from that of the respective plain-image, so that it does not allow useful information to the adversaries, and the proposed algorithm can resist any statistical attack.
(2) Entropy. Entropy is a standout feature to measure the disorder. Let I be a source of information over a set of symbols N, then entropy of I is calculated by: Fig. 3 , where the minimum, average and maximum values are 7.9966, 7.9986 and 7.9999 respectively. These results are close to 8, and hence the developed mechanism is secure against entropy attacks. (3) Pixel correlation. A meaningful image has strong correlation among the adjacent pixels. In fact, a good cryptosystem has the ability to break the pixel correlation and bring it close to zero. For any two gray values x and y, the pixel correlation can be computed as:
where E[x] and K[x] denote expectation and variance of x respectively. The range of C xy is −1 to 1.
The gray values x and y are in low correlation if C xy is close to zero. As the pixels may be adjacent in horizontal, diagonal and vertical directions, the correlation coefficients of all encrypted images along all the three directions are shown in Fig. 3 , where the respective ranges of C xy are [−0.0078, 0.0131], [−0.0092,0.0080] and [−0.0100,0.0513]. These results show that the presented method is capable of reducing the pixel correlation near to zero.
In addtion, 2000 pairs of adjacent pixels of the plain-image and cipher-image of Lena 512×512 are pseudo-randomly selected. Then correlation distributions of the adjacent pixels in all the three directions are shown in Fig. 4 , which reveals the strong pixel correlation in the plain-image but weak pixel correlation in the cipher-image generated by the current scheme.
Differential attack
In differential attacks the opponents try to get the secret keys by studying the relation between the plain-image and cipher-image. Normally attackers encrypt two images by applying a small change to these images, then compare the properties of the corresponding cipher-images. If a minor change in original image can cause the significant change in encrypted image, then the cryptosystem has high security level. The two tests NPCR (number of pixels change rate) and UACI (unified average changing intensity) are usually used to describe the security level against differential attacks. For two plain-images P and P different at only one pixel value, let C P and C P are the cipher-images of P and P respectively, then NPCR and UACI are calculated as:
where τ(u, v) = 0 if C P (u, v) = C P (u, v) and τ(u, v) = 1, otherwise. The ideal values of NPCR and UACI are 0.100 and 0.3333 respectively. We applied the above two tests on each image of the database by pseudo-randomly changing the pixel value of each image. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 5 , where the average values of NPCR and UACI are 0.9961 and 0.3334 respectively. It follows from the obtained results that our scheme is capable of resisting a differential attack.
Key analysis
For a secure cryptosystem it is essential to perform well against key attacks. A cryptosystem is highly secure against key attacks if it has key sensitivity, large key space and strongly opposes the known-plaintext/chosen-plaintext attack. The proposed scheme is analysed against key attacks as follows.
(1) Key sensitivity. Attackers usually use slightly different keys to encrypt a plain-image and then compare the obtained cipher-image with the original cipher-image to get the actual keys. Thus, high key sensitivity is essential for higher security. That is, cipher-images of a plain-image generated by slightly two different keys should be entirely different. The difference of the cipher-images is quantified by Eqs. (18) and (19) . In experiments we encrypted the whole database by changing only one key, while other keys are remain unchanged. The key sensitivity results are shown in Table 1 , where the average values of NPCR and UACI are 0.9960 and 0.3341 respectively, which specify the remarkable difference in the cipher-images. Moreover, our cryptosytem is based on pseudo-random numbers and S-boxes. The sensitivity of pseudo-random numbers sequences β * T (2, S P ) and β * T (1, S P ) and S-boxes ζ E p (p, 2, S P ) and ζ E p (p, 1, S P ) for Lena 512×512 is shown in Fig. 5 . (2) Key space. In order to resist a brute force attack, key space should be sufficiently large. For any cryptosystem key space represents the set of all possible keys required for encryption process. Generally, the size of key space should be greater than 2 128 . In present scheme the parameters a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , a 3 , δ, L, S P , t and p are used as secret keys, and we store each of them in 28 bits. So the key space of the proposed cryptosystem is 2 280 which is larger than 2 128 and hence capable to resist the brute force attack. (3) Known-plaintext/chosen-plaintext attack. In known-plaintext attack, the attacker has partial knowledge about the plain-image and cipher-image, and tries to break the cryptosystem, while in chosen-plaintext attack the attacker encrypts an arbitrary image to get the encryption keys. An all-white/black image is usually encrypted to test the performance of a scheme against these powerful attacks. We analysed our scheme by encrypting an all-white/black image of size 256 × 256. The results are shown in Fig. 6 and Table 2 , revealing that the encrypted images are significantly pseudo-randomised. Thus the proposed system is capable of preventing the above mentioned attacks. 
Comparison and discussion
Apart from security analyses, the proposed scheme is compared with some well known image encryption techniques. The gray scale images of Lena 256×256 and Lena 512×512 are encrypted using the presented method, and experimental results are listed in Table 3 . It is deduced that our scheme generates cipher-images with comparable security. Furthermore, we remark that the scheme in [23] generates pseudo-random numbers using group law on EC, while the proposed method generates pseudo-random numbers by constructing triads using auxiliary parameters of elliptic surfaces. Group law consists of many operations, which makes the pseudo-random number generation process slower than the one we present here. Moreover, the S-box used in [23] is a static one which is vulnerable [41] , while our scheme generates a dynamic S-box for each image which is more secure [42] . The scheme in [20] decomposes an image to eight blocks and uses eight dynamic S-boxes for encryption purpose. The computation of multiple S-boxes takes more time than computing only one S-box. Similarly the techniques in [2, 21] use a set of S-boxes and encrypt an image in blocks, while our newly developed scheme encrypts the whole image using only one dynamic S-box. Thus, our scheme is faster than the schemes in [2, 21] . The security system in [39] uses a chaotic system to encrypt blocks of an image. The results in Table 3 reveal that our proposed system is cryptographically stronger than the scheme in [39] . The algorithms in [3, 37] combine chaotic systems and different ECs to encrypt images. It follows from Table 3 that the security level of our scheme is comparable to that of the schemes in [3, 37] . The technique in [38] uses double chaos along with DNA coding to get good results as shown in Table 3 , but the results obtained by the new scheme are better than that of [38] .
Similarly the technique in [25] encrypts images using ECs, the disadvantage of that scheme is that it does not generate an S-box for each input image and the generation of an S-box needs trials, while our scheme generates a dynamic S-box for each input image, thus making our scheme faster and more robust than the scheme developed in [25] .
Conclusion
An image encryption scheme based on quasi-resonant triads and MECs is introduced. The proposed technique constructs triads to generate pseudo-random numbers and computes a MEC to construct an S-box for each input image. The pseudo-random numbers and S-box are then used for altering and scrambling the pixels of the plain-image respectively. As for the advantages of our proposed method, firstly triads are based on auxiliary parameters of elliptic surfaces, and thus pseudo-random numbers and S-boxes generated by our method are highly sensitive to the plain-image, which prevents adversaries from initiating any successful attack. Secondly, generation of triads using auxiliary parameters of elliptic surfaces consumes less time than computing points on ECs (we find a 4x speed increase for a range of image resolutions m ∈ [128, 512]), which makes the new encryption system relatively faster. Thirdly, our algorithm generates the cipher-images with an appropriate security level.
In summary, all of the above analyses imply that the presented scheme is able to resist all attacks. It has high encryption efficiency and less time complexity than some of the existing techniques. In the future, the current scheme will be further optimised by means of new ideas to construct the S-boxes using the constructed triads, so that for each input image we will not need to compute a MEC.
